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I. INTRODUCTION
While much disagreement exists about whether mandatory arbitration
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clauses should be used in consumer and employment contracts,1 there is
one thing on which both consumer advocates and corporate representatives
agree upon: mandatory arbitration is enormously controversial.
2
Arbitration is a hot-button issue because it removes lawsuits from the civil
justice system, which it replaces with a private justice system that is secret.
This private justice system does not have to follow judicial rules of
discovery, civil procedure, or evidence, does not require written opinions,
has limited appeal rights, and is susceptible to claims of bias in favor of
corporate repeat players and against consumers and employees.
3
One of the most controversial aspects of mandatory arbitration is its
potential to virtually eliminate aggregate litigation, such as class actions.4
Particularly in the area of consumer financial services-such as banking,
credit cards, and lending agreements-virtually every company that imposes
a mandatory arbitration clause on its customers also includes a provision
barring the customer from participating in a class action or any other joint
proceeding.' It is hardly surprising that companies would want to prevent
consumers from bringing large-scale lawsuits. Class action bans can stop
consumer protection in its tracks.6 Because much corporate misbehavior
in the consumer arena involves standard practices that inflict small injuries
1. See, e.g., Richard Frankel, TheArbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 532-
35 (2014) [hereinafter Frankel, The Arbitration Clause] (discussing the conflicts between mandatory
arbitration and preventing clients from getting fair time in court).
2. See Frank Z. LaForge, Note, Inequitable Estoppe: Arbitrating with Nonsignatoy Dfendants Under
Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 225, 225 (2005) (citing Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts
Private, The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham L Rev. 761, 763 (2002)) (asserting the
enforceability of arbitration agreements as arguably the most litigated contractual issue facing the courts
today).
3. See Frankel, The Arbitration Clause, spra note 1, at 551-52 (discussing the arguments for and
against mandatory arbitration).
4. See F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS § 6.7.5.1, at 176-77 (7th ed. 2015), updated at www.nclc.org/library (noting the increase
by large companies using arbitration clauses to "prohibit individuals from joining together as a class"
and suing them for claims that would be too small to bring on their own).
5. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) conducted the most thorough study to
date of arbitration clauses in the consumer financial services market. It found that "[a]lmost all of the
arbitration agreements studied prohibit arbitration from proceeding on a classwide basis." SMALL
BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION
AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 10 (2015).
6. See F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 177 ("[B]y attempting to prevent him from
seeking class relief, Defendant has essentially foreclosed the possibility that Plaintiff may obtain any
relief.... On these facts, enforcing the class action ban would be tantamount to allowing Defendant
to unilaterally exempt itself from New Mexico consumer protection laws." (quoting Fiser v. Dell
Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1219-21 (N.M. 2008))).
[Vol. 48:283
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on a large number of people,7 class actions are well-suited for protecting
consumers from misconduct that allows corporations to inflict repeated
violations that add up to millions of dollars in ill-gotten gains.' Similarly,
the small stakes for each consumer mean that individual claims often will
not be brought because it is not worthwhile to go through the trouble of a
filing a claim, either in court or arbitration. Consequently, class action bans
have been described as immunity provisions or "get out of jail free" cards
for corporations.
9
Defenders of class action bans, however, respond that the class action
system is broken and imposes huge costs on companies while providing
little or no benefit to consumers.1" These costs then can be passed on to
consumers in the form of higher prices.1 Advocates of class action bans
also claim that class actions impose unnecessary and time-consuming
procedural complexities that drag cases out for years for no good reason.12
By contrast, they claim that individualized arbitration offers a faster,
7. See Richard Cordray, CFPB Dir., Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the
Arbitration Field Hearing (Oct. 7, 2015), (transcript available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-the-arbitration- field-
hearing-20151007 [hereinafter Cordray, Prepared Remarks] ("Many violations of consumer financial
law involve relatively small amounts of money for the individual victim. Group claims are often the
only effective way consumers can pursue meaningful relief for harms that can add up to large amounts
of money for financial providers."'); see also F. PAUL BLAND,JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 176 (noting the
need for class actions due to the pervasiveness of small injuries to multiple individuals by large
companies).
8. See F. PAUL BLANDJR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 176-77 (explaining how class actions allow these
individuals a method of recovery that would otherwise be denied to them because their individual
claims, separately, are not large enough to bring a cause of action).
9. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see David S.
Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitraion: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 242 (2012) ("Nothing is more
claim-suppressing than a ban on class actions, particularly in cases where the economics of disputing
make pursuit of individual cases irrational.'").
10. See EricJ. Mogilnicki, The CFPB's Flawed CaseforBanning ClassAcion Waivers, LAW360 (July 13,
2016), www.law360.com/articles/8159711/print?section= banking (arguing the CFPB's report on the
cost of the class action regime, while already expensive, is still a conservative estimate). See generally
Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on the CFPB's Proposed Arbitration Rule (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://www.aba.com/Advocacy/ ommentletters/Documents/ joint-trades- arbitration-comment-
letter.pdf [hereinafter Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Arbitration Rule]
(discussing the financial burden a rule against class action bans would have on public companies,
consumers, and the court system).
11. See Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Arbitration Rule, supra note 10,
at 3 ("As customers of the providers, [the consumers] will be saddled with higher prices and/or reduced
services, because the billions of dollars in additional class action litigation costs will be passed through
to them in whole or in part.').
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cheaper, and more efficient alternative to class litigation.1 3
Prior to 2011, many courts struck down arbitration class action bans as
unfairly depriving consumers of their ability to vindicate their rights. 4 In
2011, however, the United States Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobiliy
LLC v. Concepcion,15 that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) prohibited states
from striking down class action bans on public policy grounds.1 6 As a
result, only the federal government can act to address class action bans in
arbitration clauses. Recently, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), the agency Congress created in response to the 2008 financial crisis,
did just that." In May 2016, the CFPB issued a proposed rule that would
bar companies that provide consumer financial services products1 8 from
using arbitration clauses that include a class action ban.19
The rule has drawn praise from both academic and consumer advocacy
groups.2" Not surprisingly, it has received heavycriticism from the financial
services industry.2 1 The industry has put forth many arguments against the
rule.2 2 One of its most dramatic arguments-and one that the industry has
13. Id. at 11.
14. See Discover Bank v. Super. Ct. of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) (deciding class action
bans are unfair to consumers and unjustly benefit corporations), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC 857 N.E.2d 250, 275 (111. 2006)
(deciding that the Federal Arbitration Act is only preempted if an arbitration clause is found to be
unconscionable); Feeney v. Dell, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 769 (Mass. 2009) (determining arbitration
clauses that were deemed unconscionable are severed from the contract, but do not deem the entire
agreement to be unconscionable); Muhammad v. Cry. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 100-01
(N.J. 2006) (claiming arbitration clauses could be severed from the contract if the court deemed the
clause to be unconscionable), superseded 17 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012 & Supp. 2015);
McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 857 (Wash. 2008) (en banc) (holding arbitration clauses in
contracts are void if they are found to be unconscionable).
15. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
16. Id. at 351.
17. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,830 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) [hereinafter Arbitration Agreements].
18. The CFPB's regulatory authority extends only to the financial services arena. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 5 5518(a)-(b) (2012 & Supp. 2015). Thus,
any rules it enacts would not prevent companies that offer other services from continuing to use class
action bans.
19. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 17, at 32,830.
20. See Public Citizen, Comment Letter In the Matter of Arbitration Agreements 2 (Aug. 22,
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0020-0003 (discussing the benefits of
the CFPB's proposed rule); see also Hal Abramson et al., Comment Letter of 210 Law Professors and
Scholars on the CFPB's Proposed Rule 1 (May 23, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CFPB-2016-0020-0003 (arguing for the new CFPB regulation which would bar
corporations from placing bans on class actions).
21. See Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Arbitration Rule, supra note 10,
at 2-3 (criticizing the proposed arbitration rule as unnecessarily harsh).
22. See id. at 3-5 (arguing the CFPB's proposed rule will discourage settlements and encourage
[Vol. 48:283
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repeatedly made since the CFPB first began to study arbitral class action
bans-is its assertion that ending the use of class action bans will end
consumer arbitration altogether.23 Simply put, many in the financial
services industry predict that if companies cannot use arbitration as a means
of banning class actions, they will not use arbitration at all. Instead, financial
services companies will walk away.
24
This is a bold assertion, and one that merits closer scrutiny.25 This Essay
undertakes that examination and suggests that the industry's arguments
about why it would exit arbitration lack support and are likely more
rhetorical than real. Rather, the argument is more likely a scare tactic
designed to discourage the CFPB from prohibiting the use of class action
bans. But if it is true that the industry would prefer the lack of arbitration
over having arbitration without class action bans, that is more troubling than
if the industry is just engaging in hyperbole designed to give pause to federal
regulators. It would show that the industry's preference for arbitration is
built on claim suppression. It would also show that industry likes arbitration
when arbitration stops consumers from bringing claims, but that once the
industry is faced with the possibility of actually having to arbitrate claims
with real stakes, it prefers to go to court. If anything, this represents just
another reason to support the CFPB's proposed rule than to oppose it.
2 6
II. THE STAKES OVER THE CLASS ACTION BAN
Consumer and industry advocates are up in arms about the continued
existence of class action bans in arbitration clauses. Arbitration advocates
tout that arbitration provides a faster, cheaper, and more flexible alternative
to litigation, with its drawn out discovery, formal procedures, and appellate
review. 2  Similarly, the Supreme Court has indicated that arbitration
drawn out litigation).
23. See id. at 11 (claiming the proposed nile will ban arbitration entirely b&ause it is so strict).
24. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
25. Professor Jeff Sovern has looked into the industry's claim that many companies would stop
using arbitration clauses if class action bans were prohibited and has suggested that the argument
indicates financial services companies are more interested in insulating themselves from accountability
than they are in using arbitration as an alternative to litigation. See Jeff Sovern, CFPB Arbitraion Plan
Provokes Dubious Industry Claims, AM. BANKER (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/
bankthink/cfpb-arbitration-plan-provokes-dubious-industry-claims-1077814-I.html (explaining how
the CFPB's arbitration plan would backfire by leading many companies to stop using clauses if the ban
was allowed since arbitration is more efficient for both parties than litigation).
26. For the interest of full disclosure, I have signed comments to the CFPB supporting its
proposed rule. See Abramson et al., supra note 20, at 14 (agreeing amongst all 210 professors and
scholars that the CFPB's proposed rule is beneficial to consumers).
27. See Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on the CFPB's Consumer Arbitration Study 2
20161
5
Frankel: "What We Lose in Sales, We Make Up in Volume"
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2017
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
represents a switch from one forum to another, not a waiver of a party's
substantive rights:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration.
28
But that notion of simply switching a dispute from a judicial forum to an
arbitral forum without giving up substantive rights falls once a class action
ban is added to the arbitration clause. With a class action ban, there is no
realistic alternative to litigation. That is because the cases that are best
addressed by class actions are not feasible as individual claims.29 As the
Supreme Court has long recognized:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual
to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone's (usually an attomey's) labor.30
Much (though certainly not all) corporate wrongdoing against consumers
involves the infliction of small individual injuries across individuals.3 1
While each individual may suffer a small injury, a company can reap millions
of dollars in illegal profits from its misconduct.32
Without class actions, many consumers who are victims of corporate
wrongdoing will be unable to effectively vindicate their rights. This is true
(July 13, 2015), http://consumerbankers.com/sites/default/files/uly/o20l30/ 202015%20Consumer
%20Arbitration%20Study%20Comment%20Letter.pdf [hereinafter Am. Bankers Ass'n et al.,
Comment Letter on Arbitration Study] (asserting arbitration is faster and less expensive than class
litigation).
28. Mitsubishi Motors, Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
29. See Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Benjamin Kaplan,
A Prefatoy Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969)); see also Sovern, supra note 25
("Because consumer claims are often for small amounts and the cost of arguing cases is high, many
consumer disputes can affordably be decided only in class actions.").
30. Amchem Products, Inc., 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338,
344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (asserting that class actions allow for people to obtain justice which they would
not have received if they brought their cases individually).
31. See Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supra note 7 (estimating that class action bans in the financial
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for two reasons. First, the individually small stakes make individual actions
infeasible or impractical.33 Second, many consumers may not even realize
that they have been cheated or mistreated.3 4 Those individuals therefore
would not bring an individual action because they would not know that they
had a claim in the first place. However, such individuals could be part of a
class action that would provide them with a remedy or that would require a
misbehaving corporation to change its behavior.
As a result, arbitral class action bans can effectively immunize
corporations from accountability for their wrongdoing. Courts have
described class action bans as a "get out of jail free" card for corporations.
3 s
Richard Cordray, the Director of the CFPB, stated that class action bans
give companies a "free pass" and allow them to duck their legal obligations
to consumers.
36
Companies that use class action bans in their mandatory arbitration
clauses take a different view. They do not necessarily deny that a class action
ban can make it more difficult for consumers to vindicate their rights,
though they do suggest that individualized arbitrations are more feasible
than consumer advocates suggest.37  However, they argue that the class
action system is so broken and expensive that a world without class actions
is better than a world with them, even if that means that consumers cannot
always obtain a remedy.38 They assert that many class actions do not
provide any meaningful benefit to consumers, that the high stakes involved
pressure companies to settle questionable claims, and that the high costs of
class action litigation are passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices.39 They also claim that even if consumers cannot bring class actions,
33. See Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) ("It would hardly be
an improvement to have in lieu of this single class action 17 million suits each seeking damages of $15
to $30.... The realitc alternative... is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as
only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.'); Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supra note 7 ("Many violations
of consumer financial law involve relatively small amounts of money for the individual victim. Group
claims often are the only effective way consumers can pursue meaningful relief for harms that can add
up to large amounts of money for financial providers.").
34. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 17, at 32,857.
35. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
36. See Cordray, Prepared Remarks, supra note 7 (stressing the problems with class action bans by
giving corporations an unfair advantage).
37. See Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Arbitration Study, supra note 27, at 12-13
(pointing out that the CFPB's study of consumer finance arbitrations found that consumers brought
1,847 individual claims in arbitration between 2010 and 2012).
38. See Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Arbitration Rule, supra note 10,
at 9 (discussing the problems with class action systems versus arbitration with regard to cost and
expediency).
39. See Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Arbitration Rule, supra note 11.
2016]
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state and federal government agencies and attorneys general can bring
administrative enforcement actions on behalf of their citizens.a
The impact of class action bans is hard to understate. By one measure,
in the financial services sector alone, the use of class action bans has
enriched corporations by more than half a billion dollars per year. The
CFPB, in a comprehensive study of arbitration provisions in consumer
financial services contracts, found that consumers who initiated individual
arbitrations in the years 2010-2011 received total relief of $172,433, and
$189,107 total debt forbearance.41 By contrast, during the period of 2008-
2012, the study found that class actions involving financial services products
provided total relief of $540 million per year to an average of seventy million
consumers a year.42  Moreover, that number does not account for the
additional value of any injunctive relief those class actions provided.43 The
amounts awarded in individual arbitrations are a pittance compared to the
amounts paid out in class actions. If companies can eliminate class actions,
40. This claim seems questionable at best. While government agencies can bring actions against
some companies, they have limited resources and cannot police all abuses. See Discover Bank v. Super.
Ct. of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that government enforcement actions are not an
adequate substitute for private class actions), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333 (2011); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of Washington in Support of Appellants
at 4-5, Scott v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007) (No. 77406-4), 2006 WL 811763
(arguing class actions further a legitimate public interest that should be protected, stating "private
consumer action[s] [are] a vital feature" of Washington's Consumer Protection Act, and explaining that
the Washington Legislature specifically amended the state's Consumer Protection Act to create a
private tight of action so that private parties could aid the state in protecting consumers from illegal
conduct). For example, the CFPB found in its arbitration study that there was very little overlap
between the enforcement actions brought by administrative agencies and consumer class actions.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 1.4.8, at 17-
18 (2015) [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS] (discussing the
benefits to consumer class actions and why they should be protected by the government). In other
words, private class actions were filling in the gaps left by agencies based on their limited resources.
Moreover, state legislatures, when enacting consumer protection statutes, have expressly recognized
that state governments are not sufficient on their own and that they want to encourage private parties
to act as private attorneys general and supplement the actions of state governments by bringing their
own actions. See Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (N.C. 1981) (explaining North Carolina's
legislature adopted its consumer protection law to encourage "private enforcement"); Scott, 161 P.3d
at 1006 (explaining that the Washington Legislature specifically amended the state's Consumer
Protection Act (CPA) to permit private enforcement and finding "[p]rivate actions by private citizens
are now an integral part of CPA enforcement").
41. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, § 1.4.3, at 11-13.
42. See id. § 1.4.7, at 16 (stating "the annual average of the aggregate amount of the settlements
was $540 million per year[,]" identifying the estimated class membership size as being 350 million
across five years, and implying that if class action settlements were done away with, then companies
would be half a billion dollars richer every year).
43. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 48:283
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they can hold on to another $500 million or more per year that would
otherwise go to injured consumers. In the words of one lawyer who
advocates for consumers, prohibiting class action bans is "the single most
transformative thing the [CFPB] can do to level the playing field for
consumers."
44
Just as consumer and industry representatives are divided about the
legitimacy of class action bans, state and federal courts also were divided, at
least prior to 2011. Because class action bans effectively eliminate consumer
claims, consumers challenged the enforceability of class action bans in court
in a number of states, arguing that they were unconscionable or a violation
of public policy under state law.4' Although courts were divided, many
struck down class action bans on the ground that they deprived consumers
of a meaningful remedy for their wrongdoing.
4 6
In 2011, however, consumers' efforts to use the courts to block
enforcement of class action bans came to a grinding halt. In AT&TMobilioy
LLC v. Concepion, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a
California rule prohibiting enforcement of class action bans.4 7 In doing so,
the Court took away the power of courts and state legislatures to require the
availability of class procedures.48 As a result, only the federal government
retains authority to regulate class action bans in arbitration clauses.49 Hence,
44. Ben Seal, Lawyers Predict Li igation Avalanche' from Class-Ac/ion Waiver Ban, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (June 10, 2016), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=120275984
0 0 9 3/
Lawyers-Predict-Litigation-Avalanche-From-ClassAction-Waiver-Ban?slretrn=20160825183938
(quoting consumer attorney Deepak Gupta).
45. See F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, § 6.7.5.1, at 177 (noting the success consumers
had in striking down class action bans as unconscionable).
46. Compare Discover Bank v. Super. Ct. of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005) (finding some
class action bans unenforceable), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011),
Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 257 (Ill. 2006) (declaring class action waivers
enforceable on a case-by-case basis), Feeney v. Dell, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 765 (Mass. 2009) (declining
to enforce a prohibition on class actions in a consumer contract), Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of
Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006) (holding a class-arbitration waiver unconscionable),
superseded by Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 5 2 (2012 & Supp. 2015), and McKee v. AT&T Corp.,
191 P.3d 845, 858 (Wash. 2008) (en banc) (holding the class action waiver to be unconscionable), with
Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868, 878 (11 th Cir. 2005) (enforcing a class action
ban). See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004)
(enforcing a class action ban, stating the arbitration clause did not oppress or leave the plaintiffs without
remedy enough to be unconscionable); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39
(4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the arguments that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it
was unconscionable, and "that forcing consumers... to arbitrate consumer protection claims against
[financial services] companies ... is against public policy relating to consumer protection'").
47. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
48. See id. at 344 ("Requiring the availability of class-wide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.'").
49. See, e.g., id. at 357 (holding the FAA preempts the California rule which classifies the majority
2016]
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the CFPB's decision whether or not to regulate the use of class action bans
has taken on that much more significance.
III. THE CFPB AND ITS ACTIONS RELATING TO ARBITRATION
The CFPB was born in response to the financial crisis that reached its
height in 2007-2008.'° Congress reacted to these new economic conditions
by enacting the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, and as part of that act, Congress
created the Bureau.51 Congress gave the agency authority to regulate
businesses that provide consumer financial services, such as banking,
lending, mortgage, and student loan services.52
Congress also gave the CFPB authority to study and regulate the use of
mandatory arbitration clauses by companies providing consumer financial
services. It directed the Bureau to conduct a study and provide a report to
Congress concerning "the use of agreements providing for arbitration of
any future dispute between covered persons and consumers in connection
with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or
services."5 3 It then gave the Bureau authority to issue regulations that "may
prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement
between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product
or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the
parties."
5 4
Congress placed two conditions on the Bureau's regulatory authority.
First, the Bureau can impose limits on mandatory arbitration only if it
determines that any such limit "is in the public interest and for the
protection of consumers."5 Second, the Bureau's findings in support of
its regulations must be consistent with the results of its statutorily mandated
of class waivers in consumercontracts as unconscionable because "it 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"' (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
50. Creating the Consumer Finanaal Protection Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
htrp://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
51. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
5 1028, 124 Stat. 1376, 2003-04 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C 5 5518) (establishing the duties of the
newly created Bureau).
52. See Creating the Consumer FinancalProtection Bureau, supra note 50 ("The agency would also have
responsibility for supervision and enforcement with respect to the laws over providers of consumer
financial products and services that escaped regular [flederal oversight.").
53. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1028,
124 Stat. 1376, 2003-04 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 5518).
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study of arbitration clauses.5 6
The Bureau spent Several years studying the use of arbitration clauses by
financial services companies and preparing its report for Congress. In
December 2013, it delivered a 168-page preliminary report that described its
findings to date and offered the opportunity for interested parties to
comment and to provide additional information to the Bureau.5 7 In March
2015, the Bureau reported its final study to Congress.5" That study made
several findings supporting the claim that class action bans are widespread
in consumer financial services contracts and that they insulate companies
from being held accountable for their wrongdoing.5 9
First, it found that arbitration clauses are widespread in the financial
services sector. More than 53% of all credit card deposits and 58% of
insured bank deposit from the 103 largest banks were governed by contracts
with arbitration clauses.6° In other sectors, the prevalence of arbitration
clauses was much greater.61 More than 83% of storefront payday loan
contracts, prepaid payment card contracts, student loan contracts, and
mobile wireless contracts contained arbitration clauses.62 All told, tens of
millions of consumers are subject to an arbitration clause in one contract or
another.63 These results are consistent with other smaller studies showing
that class action bans are almost universal in consumer arbitration clauses.
64
Second, nearly all of these arbitration clauses banned class actions. In the
six product markets that the CFPB studied, class action bans were imposed
in more than 85% of contracts with arbitration agreements covering 99% of
the market share across those markets.65 The result is that a consumer who
56. Id. at 2003-04.
57. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS:
SECTION 1028(a) STUDY RESULTS TO DATE (2013) [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
PRELIMINARY RESULTS].
58. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, § 1, at 2.
59. Id. 5 1.4.1-1.4.3 at 9-12.
60. Id. §§ 1.4.1, 2.3 at 10, 7-8.
61. See id. § 2.3, Table 1 at 8 (providing statistics on arbitration clause prevalence in different
markets).
62. Id. 5 2.3 at 7-8.
63. See id. § 1.4.1, 2.3 at 9, 7-8 ("Tens of millions of consumers use consumer financial products
or services that are subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses.").
64. See general#y Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008)
(conducting a study of arbitration clauses in which every arbitration clause between a business and a
consumer contained a class action ban).
65. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, 5 1.4.1, at 10
("Nearly all the arbitration clauses studied include provisions stating that arbitration may not proceed
on a class basis.").
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has a dispute with a financial services company would most likely be
required to arbitrate that dispute, and to do so on an individual basis only.
Third, the Bureau made findings indicating that class action bans create a
substantial impediment to relief for consumers and thus insulate financial
services providers from accountability for misconduct. It found that even
though tens of millions of consumers were subject to arbitration clauses,
consumers filed an average of only 411 arbitrations per year.6 6  Most of
those claims involved higher dollar amounts where individual claims are
more practicable.61 With respect to claims of $1,000 or less-the type of
small dollar claim that class actions are designed to preserve-only twenty-
five individual arbitrations were filed per year.68 The total amount of relief
for the tens of millions of consumers subject to arbitration clauses in 2010-
2011 amounted to $172,433.69
By contrast, the Bureau found consumer class actions in 2008-2012
provided settlements that dwarfed the amount provided in arbitration. The
amount of cash settlements in class actions averaged $540 million per
year.7 0  That amount does not include additional injunctive relief to
consumers where companies changed their practices in response to class
action settlements.71  Such injunctive relief provides benefits to all
consumers, not just the specific members of the class. The Bureau provided
several examples of substantial, valuable injunctive relief resulting from class
action settlements.72 Although defenders of class action bans assert that
class actions provide no meaningful relief to consumers and merely enrich
their attorneys, the Bureau also provided several examples where consumers
received substantial cash payments totaling tens of millions of dollars.7 3
66. Id. 5 1.4.3 at 11.
67. See id. § 1.4.3 at 12 ("The average consumer affirmative claim amount in arbitration filings
with affirmative consumer claims was around $27,000.").
68. Id. § 1.4.3 at 12. Some scholars have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Judith Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights,
124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2804 (2015) ("The result has been the mass production of arbitration clauses
without a mass of arbitrations. Although hundreds of millions of consumers and employees are obliged
to use arbitration as their remedy, almost none do so-rendering arbitration not as a vindication but
as an unconstitutional evisceration of statutory and common law rights.").
69. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, 5 1.4.3, at 12.
70. Id. § 1.4.7 at 16.
71. See id. (noting the figure represents a floor).
72. See, e.g., Arbitration Agreements, supra note 17, at 32,858 (citing Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2010)) (describing a case in which a litigation settlement required
Wells Fargo to change its overdraft practices throughout the United States).
73. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRELIMINARY RESULTS, supra note 57, § 4.8.2 at 104-
08 for a list of cases where consumers received substantial cash payments. For example, in the In re
CheckingAccount Overdraft litigation class action, five million class members received $61 million in cash
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Based on these and other findings, the Bureat recently issued a proposed
rule to address class action bans."4  The rle would prohibit financial
services companies from including class action bans in their arbitration
clauses.7" The rule also requires financial services companies to provide the
CFPB with certain data regarding their use of arbitration.
6
IV. THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATHWATER
The CFPB's proposed rule has provoked a huge public response.77 As
of August 15, 2016, a week before the deadline for public comments, the
Bureau had already received more than 8,380 public comments.7 8 Not
surprisingly, financial services companies and organizations representing
those companies have staunchly opposed any limitation on the use of class
action bans.7 9 Ever since the CFPB released its preliminary results, financial
services organizations have critiqued the Bureau's findings and accused the
Bureau of having an anti-arbitration agenda."0 The industry stepped up its
attacks when the CFPB stated in October 2015 that it was considering
whether to propose a rule prohibiting class action bans.81
Perhaps seeing no other alternative, the industry invoked the nuclear
option. It has vociferously and repeatedly asserted that if the CFPB
relief and injunctive relief valued at an additional $52 million. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
PRELIMINARY RESULTS, supra note 57, 5 4.8.2 at 108-09 (citing In re Checking Account Overdraft
Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (S.D. Fla. 2010)).
74. See Arbitration Agreements, supra note 17, at 32,830 ("Mhe proposed rule would prohibit
covered providers of certain consumer financial products and services from using an [arbitration]
agreement with a consumer... to bar the consumer from filing or participating in a class action with
respect to covered consumer financial product or service.").
75. Id.
76. Id. at 32,830-31.
77. See Lisa Lambert, Battle Against Forced Arbitration in Financial Contracts Could Take Years, INS. J.
(Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016/08/22/423994.htm
(" ]housands of angry consumers and business representatives have flooded the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau with comments on its May proposal to block companies from forcing customers to
take disputes to arbitration instead of joining group lawsuits.').
78. Id. As of the date this Essay went to press, that number had risen to 66,495 comments. The
total number of comments received, which the agency updates daily can be found at Arbitration
Agreements, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=CFPB-2016-0020 (last
visited Feb. 26, 2017).
79. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 78.
80. See, e.g., Letter from David Hirschmann, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Cent. for Capital
Mkts. Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, & Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Inst.
for Legal Reform, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Monica Jackson, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 2
(Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013_12.11_CFPB_-
_arbitration cover_letter.pdf (expressing dissatisfaction with the Bureau's study and implying that the
CFPB has a biased agenda).
81. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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prohibits class action bans, then financial services companies will stop using
arbitration clauses and will walk away from arbitration altogether. A
sampling of comments from different industry organizations and
representatives follows:
* "[M]any companies have publicly stated that they would abandon
arbitration entirely if the class-action waivers contained in their
arbitration agreements are rendered unenforceable."
82
* "[I]f the CFPB moves forward with regulating arbitration
agreements, many companies will likely abandon arbitration
altogether[.] ,
83
" "[Tlhe Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's proposed plan on
class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements will cause
companies to abandon arbitration completely.",
84
* "If [class action] waivers are not permitted, I think most companies
will abandon the use of arbitration altogether."
85
* "The proposed rule also threatens to have an adverse impact on
consumers because arbitration is likely to disappear almost entirely if
class action waivers are eliminated."8 6
There is some support for the idea that the industry would prefer to
abandon arbitration than simply forgo using class action bans. As the
Bureau found in its study, most of the arbitration clauses it examined
contained an anti-severability clause.87 This type of anti-severability clause
states that if the class action ban is found to be unenforceable, then the
whole arbitration clause will be stricken.88  The industry's use of such
clauses could be read to indicate that without the option of a class action
ban, financial services companies would prefer to litigate than to arbitrate.
At the same time, the industry's assertion that it would abandon
82. Letter from David Hirschmann to Monica Jackson, supra note 80, at 55.
83. ACA Denounces CFPB's Effort to Ban Arbitration As Evidence of Unbalanced Regulation, ACA INT'L
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.acainternational.org/cfpbarticle-aca-members-participate-in-sbrefa-pan
elto-discuss-arbitration-rulemaking-37366.aspx.
84. Alan Kaplinsky, Indushy's PreferenceforArbiraion Is a Reaity, AM. BANKER (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/industrys-preference-for-arbitration-is-a-reality-
1077919-1.html.
85. Seal, supra note 44 (relating Alan Kaplinsky's statement).
86. Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Arbitration Rule, spra note 10, at 4.
87. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, § 1.4.1, at 10.
88. Id; see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 469-71 (2015) (describing and
interpreting an anti-severability clause used by DIRECTV which stated in part: "'[i]f... the law of your
state would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this
entire Section 9 [the arbitration section] is unenforceable"').
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arbitration seems puzzling. After all, financial services companies try to
justify their use of arbitration clauses by arguing that arbitration is faster,
cheaper and more efficient than litigation for individual cases.89 As others
have pointed out, if that's true, industry should continue to prefer to use
arbitration over litigation for individual disputes.
90
Most of the time, industry groups have simply asserted that companies
would abandon arbitration if the CFPB prohibits class action bans without
providing any detailed explanation for why they would do so. However,
two different rationales have appeared in some industry comments. Both
rationales rest on the assumption that he financial benefits of arbitration
would disappear if class action bans disappear.
First, some commenters have suggested it is too expensive for companies
to deal with two different dispute resolution systems-judicial and
arbitration.9 1 According to this view, companies say they would never
resolve class claims in arbitration because it is too risky for them.9 2 If they
were going to deal with class claims in court, then they would rather deal
with all claims in court so that they would only be dealing with a single
dispute resolution mechanism.93 Having to organize and manage two
different dispute resolution systems creates added expenses that companies
would prefer to avoid.9 4
89. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRELIMINARY REsULTS, supra note 57, § 1.1 at 8 (stating
that "defenders of pre-dispute arbitration clauses take the view that arbitration offers 'a faster, more
efficient and more cost-effective method of resolving disputes than court litigation"' (citation
omitted)).
90. See Sovern, supra note 25 ("But if the industry truly believes that arbitration is so much better
than litigation at resolving disputes, shouldn't it prefer arbitration to litigation for resolving individual
disputes, where there is not a threat of a class action?").
91. CFPB Pubbshes LongAwaitedProposedRule Pr cluding Class-Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements,
STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN 2 (May 5, 2016), http://www.stroock.com/siteFiles/Publications/
CFPBPublishesLongAwaitedProposedRule.pdf
92. See id. ("[l]ndustry spokespersons have made clear that very few financial services companies
will accept the risk of class arbitration ... ."); see also supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
93. Commentary, supra note 91, at 2.
94. See Christopher L. Allen et al., CFPB Takes Latest Step Toward Limting Use of Pre-Dipute
Arbitration Agreements for Consumer Financial Products and Services, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER 3
(Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.apks.com/-/media/files/perspectives/publications/2015/10/cfpb-
takes-latest-step-toward-limiting-use-of-pr__/files/newsletter-item/fileattachment/advl 9oct2015
cfpbtakeslateststep.pdf ("In addition, companies may decide to abandon arbitration clauses altogether
to avoid developing costly compliance systems equipped to handle multiple avenues of dispute
resolution."); see also Ashley Nicole Baker, CFPB Anti-Arbitration Rule Gives Milons to Class Action
Lawyers, Leaves Consumers in the Dust, FREEDOMWORKS (May 18, 2016), http://www.
freedomworks.org/content/cfpb-and-arbitration-rule-gives-millions-class-action-lawyers-leaves-
consumers-dust ("Following the enactment of this regulation, companies start spending huge amounts
of money defending against class action suits. The cost-benefit of arbitration would change and
companies would eventually abandon the entire process.').
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Second, some industry groups have suggested that arbitration is not
profitable without the class action ban.9" Industry advocates claim that
individual arbitration is essentially a loss leader for financial services
companies. They claim that companies lose money on individual
arbitrations because many companies pay all of the filing fees and costs of
arbitration or an outsized share of the costs.9 6 Consumer arbitrations can
have filing fees of as much as $1,700 and the parties must also pay for the
arbitrator's time, which could run from as little as $750 to as much as $1,500
per arbitrator per day.97 But companies are willing to endure this purported
financial hardship of arbitration in exchange for the financial benefits of
avoiding class actions.98
The industry's claim that companies will walk away from arbitration in
the absence of a class action ban is a bold one. If the industry wants the
Bureau to consider and rely on its assertions when deciding whether to issue
a rule, then those arguments should receive close scrutiny. As explained
below, one should be skeptical about whether either rationale is true and
whether they more likely reflect an attempt to scare the CFPB away from
issuing a rule. But if the industry is correct that arbitration is financially
feasible only by eliminating exposure to class actions or other aggregate
litigation, that is even more troubling than if its assertions are false. If it is
true, that would indicate that arbitration only works by taking away the rights
of the millions of consumers who would otherwise be members of class
95. See Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Arbitration Rule, supra note 10,
at 12 ("The costs [of class action litigation] are unprecedented and staggering.").
96. See id. ("Many, if not most, financial services providers anticipate they would abandon
arbitration altogether, since the cost both of subsidizing individual arbitrations and the cost of
defending the anticipated onslaught of consumer class actions would be prohibitive."); see also Letter
from Am. Banker Ass'n et al., to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec'y., Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau 2 (Aug. 22, 2016), http://consumerbankers.com/cba-issues/comment-letters/joint-trades-
letter-cfpb-re-notice-proposed-rulemaking-arbitration (expressing concern that the proposed rule,
"while not irectl banning pre-dispute arbitration, would have the practical effect of eliminating
arbitration as an option for consumers because it will be uneconomic for companies to continue
subsidizing arbitration for their customers if the Bureau forces them to bear the massive expenses
associated with class action litigation').
97. CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULEs, r. 33-34 (AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N 2016).
98. See Letter from Am. Banker Ass'n et al. to Monica Jackson, supra note 96, at 2 ("[M]any
companies presendy offer subsidized arbitration programs for their customers: they pay the customer's
filing fee, most of the discovery and other costs, and some even pay a 'bonus' to customers who prevail
in arbitration.'); Letter from David T. Hirsehmann, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Cent. for
Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau 2 (May 2, 2016), https://cfpbmonitor.ballardspahrblogs.com/wp-content/
uploads/sites/5/2016/05/05-02-201 6-Letter- from-D-Hirschmann-to-Dir-Cordray-re-arbitration-fie-
.pdf (asserting that most companies pay for consumers to bring claims in arbitration and that arbitration
is virtually free for the consumer).
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action lawsuits, and who would otherwise benefit from the cash and
injunctive relief those cases bring. If industry is willing to trade the financial
loss of individual arbitrations for the gain of widespread claim suppression,
then maybe it would not be such a bad thing if industry chose to abandon
arbitration altogether.
V. SCRUTINIZING INDUSTRY'S RATIONALES
I am skeptical of both proffered rationales for industry's supposed
abandonment of arbitration if class action bans are eliminated. I believe the
industry is employing a scare tactic to try and dissuade the CFPB from
banning class actions. However, if industry really would abandon arbitration
if the class action waiver disappeared, that fact merely underscores that
industry uses arbitration to suppress claims rather than to resolve them. If
that is the case, then causing industry to give up arbitration and go back to
resolving disputes in court would benefit consumers and society and should
be encouraged.
A. Maintaining Dual Compliance Regimes
As stated above, some in the financial services industry have argued that
if class actions go to court, they would prefer to have all claims go to court
because it is too expensive to maintain two separate systems for dispute
resolution.99 This claim rests on the assumption that companies do not
currently utilize two different dispute resolution systems. They either
address all disputes in arbitration or all disputes in court; but they cannot
afford to address some disputes in arbitration and others in court.
That assumption is almost certainly false. First, companies already
maintain multiple dispute resolution systems. Companies have relationships
with many entities and individuals, not just consumers. And while many
companies use arbitration clauses in their contracts with consumers, they
use arbitration clauses much less frequently in their contracts with other
companies.1" 0 One study of twenty-one publicly traded companies found
that more than three-quarters of those companies used arbitration clauses
in their consumer contracts, but that fewer than 10% of their non-
consumer, non-employment contracts contained arbitration clauses.
101
Second, many companies that use arbitration clauses explicitly carve out
99. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
100. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 64, at 883 ("The large companies in our data overwhelming
selected arbitration as the method for resolving consumer disputes and permitted litigation as the
method for resolving business [to business] disputes.').
101. Id. at 884 (2008).
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certain claims from their arbitration clauses and reserve them for judicial
resolution.10 2 While carve-outs may only cover a small subset of possible
claims, carve-outs are a common feature of arbitration clauses.1 "3 In fact,
a wealth of litigation has sprung up over the use of "non-mutual" arbitration
clauses-clauses that require individuals to arbitrate the claims that they are
most likely to affirmatively bring while exempting the types of claims that
corporations are most likely to bring against individuals, such as debt
collection claims.104 Companies therefore are purposely writing their
arbitration clauses to maintain two different dispute resolution systems: one
for the claims covered by the arbitration clause, and another for the claims
carved out by the arbitration clauses.
In the consumer financial services context, a common carve-out is one
that permits either party to bring claims of $1,500 or less in small claims
court rather than in arbitration.105 In its study, the CFPB found that most
of the arbitration clauses it reviewed contained a small claims carve-out.10 6
In several product markets, small claims carve-outs were included in 80-
93% of arbitration clauses.1 0" Interestingly, the CFPB found that
corporations were much more likely to bring claims against consumers in
small claims court than consumers were to bring claims in small claims court
102. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Unbundg Procedure: Carve-Outs from
Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REv. 1945, 1956 (2014) (explaining how companies use "carve-outs" with
"varying frequency across a number of different contracting contexts"); Christopher R. Drahozal &
Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL.
433, 450-51 (2010) (listing examples of when companies will use arbitration and when they will use
litigation); Donald Lee Rome & David M.S. Shaiken, Arbitration Carve-Out Clauses in Commercial and
Consumer Secured Loan Transactions, AM. ARB. ASS'N, Aug.-Oct. 2006, at 2 (explaining why carve-outs
are useful in certain contexts).
103. See. Drahozal & O'Connor, supra note 102, at 1950 (describing carve-outs as a widespread
"phenomenon" with "varying frequency" across different contexts).
104. See, e.g., F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 6.7.3.1-3.5, at 165--70 (analyzing how
various courts have ruled on the issue of conscionability with regards to non-mutual arbitration
clauses); Richard Frankel, Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion: Why Unconscionabiko Survives the Supreme
Court's Arbitraion Juriorudence, 2014J. DISP. RESOL. 225, 242-44 (2014) [hereinafter Frankel,
Concepcion andMs-Concepcion] (discussing legal challenges to non-mutual arbitration clauses).
105. See Arbitration Agreements, supra note 17, at 32,835 n.71 ("[Miost arbitration agreements in
consumer financial contracts contain a 'small claims court carve-out' that provides the parties with a
contractual right to pursue a claim in small claims court." (quoting CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, § 2.5.2, at 33)).
106. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, § 1.4.6, at 15
("Most arbitration clauses that we reviewed contained small claims court carve-outs.').
107. Id. § 2.5.2 at 33. More specifically, 93% of payday loan arbitration clauses, 85% of mobile
wireless arbitration clauses, 83% of private student loan arbitration clauses, 59% of checking account
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against companies.18 In the jurisdictions it studied, consumers brought
870 small claims actions in 2012 while corporations brought 41,000 small
claims actions, almost all of which were debt collection actions.109 In short,
it is the financial services providers-the same entities that say that they will
abandon arbitration without class action bans rather than use different
dispute resolution mechanisms-that are creating a dual dispute resolution
system by repeatedly invoking small claims court to collect debts while
simultaneously requiring other disputes to be resolved in arbitration. And
to the extent that small claims court may differ in certain respects from a
more traditional state or federal civil court, the small claims carve out
actually creates a third type of dispute resolution mechanism.1 0 This
further undercuts any claim that it is financially impractical for corporations
to be subject to more than one dispute resolution system.
Third, many companies include an "opt out" feature that permits a
customer to opt out of the arbitration provision if they provide written
notice within a specified period of time, typically 30-60 days.111 Those
companies allow customers to maintain their contractual relationship
without giving up the right to go to court if the customers choose to exercise
that right. 12 This practice also creates dual dispute resolution systems by
allowing some consumers to go to court while subjecting others to
arbitration.
1 3
108. See, e.g., id. § 1.4.6 at 16 (revealing credit card issuers were "significantly more likely" to sue
consumers than the other way around).
109. Id.
110. See generall Gerald Lebovits, Small Claims Courts Offer Prompt Adjudication Based on Substantive
Law, N.Y. ST. B. J., Dec. 1998, at 6 (providing a detailed description of small claims courts and
describing the features which distinguish small claims courts from traditional litigation courts).
111. Id. 5 2.5.1 at 31.
112. See, e.g., Honig v. Comcast of Ga. 1, LLC, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
(quoting Comcast contract with consumer stating that the consumer's decision to opt out of arbitration
"will have no adverse effect" on the continuing contractual relationship with the customer).
113. The cynic would say that the opt-out provision is consistent with the industry's preference
for a single dispute-resolution system because the companies that employ opt-outs do not expect their
customers to actually use them. Indeed, the CFPB found that most consumers were unaware that an
opt-out right existed, and none of the consumers they surveyed had exercised that right. See
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, 5 1.4.2, at 11 ("Consumers
are generally unaware of any arbitration clause opt-out opportunities they may have been offered by
their card issuer."). Rather, companies indude an opt-out provision as a way of fighting
unconscionability challenges to their class action bans. With an opt-out, companies can argue the class
action ban is not unconscionable, even if it is exculpatory, because consumers can choose whether or
not they are subject to the arbitration clause. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 546 F.3d 1078,
1085 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that a meaningful opportunity to opt-out of an arbitration
clause can be evidence that the clause is not procedurally unconscionable (quoting Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002))). Companies lose little by putting in the opt-out
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Fourth, arbitration clauses are not self-executing. While the clause may
subject all disputes to arbitration, the parties can choose not to enforce the
arbitration provision.'14 If a consumer files a claim in court against a
company, the company can choose to litigate in court by not invoking the
arbitration clause."' If the company declines to invoke the clause, then
that claim will stay in court even if other disputes end up in arbitration." 6
In fact, parties will sometimes invoke two different dispute resolution
systems in the same proceeding."' A fertile source of litigation concerning
the enforceability of arbitration agreements is whether a party has waived its
right to compel arbitration." 8 Waiver can occur where a party initially
defends an action in court, say by filing a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment, or by participating in discovery and then belatedly
decides that it would rather send the case to arbitration." 9
Finally, prior to the Supreme Court's Concepdon decision, companies
utilized different dispute resolution systems because, at that time, some
states enforced class action bans and some states did not.120  Given the
common use of anti-severability provisions, which state that if the class
action ban is unenforceable then the entire arbitration clause is
unenforceable, a company's arbitration clause would apply in states that
if few consumers will ever use it.
114. See, e.g., Eberhard Architects, LLC v. Bogart Architecture, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1185,
2014 WL 4354561, at *5 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (declaring a party may choose not to invoke an arbitration
provision and proceed with litigation).
115. See, e.g., id. (allowing the party to avoid arbitration and use the court system if it so choses).
116. See Grand Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 748 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining
that a party is free to exclude certain claims from the scope of their arbitration agreement thereby
leaving those claims to litigation (first quoting Soto-Fonalledas v. Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel Spa &
Casino, 640 F.3d 471, 474 (1st Cir. 2011); and then quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989))).
117. See, e.g., N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding
the plaintiff did not waive its right to arbitration because it demanded arbitration and "moved for a
stay immediately upon filing the complaint").
118. See F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, 5 6.7.2.4, at 164 (discussing the doctrine of
waiver as applied to arbitration clauses); Frankel, The Arb'traion Clause, supra note 1, at 562 ("Waiver
ordinarily results when a party fails to demand arbitration of a dispute, chooses instead to participate
in litigation, and later decides that it wants to enforce the arbitration clause.').
119. See Frankel, TheArbitraion Clause, supra note 1, at 562 (describing how waiver occurs). For
examples involving financial services companies attempting to compel arbitration after first litigating
in court, see Lewallen v. Green Tree Serving LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a
financial services company's attempt to compel arbitration after invoking litigation), Marie v. Allied
Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing how a party potentially waived its right to
arbitration), and RaymondJames Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005) (concluding
waiver of an arbitration agreement should be analyzed the same as any other contractual issue).
120. See supra note 46.
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enforced class action bans, but not in states that did not enforce them.
121
The arbitration clause that was the subject of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imbutgia12 2 provides a good example.
DIRECTV's contract with consumers contained a mandatory arbitration
provision with a class action ban.123 The clause further stated that if "the
law of your state" renders the class action ban unenforceable, then the whole
arbitration clause would be unenforceable.124 Consequently, DIRECTV
was required to use arbitration in states that enforce class action bans but
was subject to litigation in states that did not enforce 
them.1 2 5
All told, the assertion that financial service companies will abandon
arbitration because they cannot manage two different dispute resolution
systems seems fanciful and empirically unsupported. Rather, the assertion
may simply be an attempt to raise the specter of a slippery slope to
discourage the CFPB from prohibiting class action bans. As explained
below, I think the industry's second justification fares no better.
B. Is Individualized Arbitralion Financially Infeasible Without a Class Action
Ban?
The industry's other rationale for asserting companies will abandon
arbitration if class action bans are prohibited is that individualized
arbitration is a money loser for companies.
1 26 Because companies often
pay all or most of the filing fees and for arbitrator expenses, they assert they
will lose money on arbitration unless they can counteract those losses with
savings from avoiding class actions.' This argument is flawed in several
respects.
First, the premise of industry's argument is that companies would never
choose to use an arbitration clause without a class action ban.
1 28 However,
companies do so all the time. While class action bans are now nearly
universal among financial services companies, as the CFPB found, that was
121. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
122. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imbrugia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
123. Id. at 466.
124. Id. at 464.
125. Id. at 478.
126. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
127. Id.
128. See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, CFPB to Consumer Finandal Services Companies: Prepare
to Wave Goodbye to Class Action Waivers, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Oct. 7, 2015), http://
www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/
2015-10-07-cfpb-to-consumer-financial-
services-companies-prepare-to-wave-goodbye.aspx ("[M]any if not most companies would not
include... [a class arbitration] option since an industry trade group has characterized class arbitration
as 'a worst-of-all-worlds Frankenstein's monster.").
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not always the case. The widespread growth in the use of arbitration clauses
began in the 1980s following the Supreme Court's decision that the FAA
applied in both federal and state court and it could preempt state law.129
Yet, class action bans did not come into vogue until the mid-to-late 1990s
after industry lawyers devised them as a way of shielding companies from
liability. 130 Moreover, plenty of companies still use arbitration clauses that
do not include class action bans,131 and the major arbitration providers have
specific rules for interpreting an arbitration clause for purposes of
determining whether the clause permits class proceedings.132 Additionally,
some companies have responded to the Supreme Court's endorsement of
class action bans in Concepcion by adding class action bans to their arbitration
129. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1984) (holding section 2 of the FAA
applies in state court and that it preempted a provision of state law requiring judicial consideration of
certain claims); Arbitration Agreements, supra note 17, at 32,835 ("From the passage of the FAA
through the 1970s, arbitration continued to be used in commercial disputes between companies.
Beginning in the 1980s, however, companies began to use arbitration agreements in contracts with
consumers, investors, employees, and franchisees that were not negotiated." (first citing Soia
Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 850, 858 (1961); and then citing Stephen
J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jugy-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 167, 179)).
130. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitraion Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of
Justice, N.Y. ThMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/O1/business/dealbook/
arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 (describing concerted efforts by
financial services companies to promote arbitration and block class actions starting in 1999); see also
Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, but Who's the Predator? Banker's Side, 7 Bus. L. TODAY
24, 28 (1997) ("Lenders that have not yet implemented arbitration programs should promptly consider
doing so, since each day that passes brings with it the risk of additional multimillion-dollar class action
lawsuits that might have been avoided had arbitration procedures been in place.'"); Bennet S. Koren,
OurMini Theme: Class Actions, 7 Bus. L. TODAY 18, 23 (1998) (recommending that companies use class
action bans because "[t]he absence of a class remedy ensures that there will be no formal notification
and most claims will therefore remain unasserted').
131. See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013) (addressing a challenge
to the arbitrator's decision to allow class proceedings where the arbitration clause did not specifically
prohibit them); Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 14-16405, 2016 WL 4437615, at *12 (9th Cir.
Aug. 23, 2016) (Watford, J., concurring) (noting that the arbitration clause at issue did not expressly
ban class actions). See general# Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)
(addressing whether class proceedings were permitted where the arbitration clause did not contain a
class action ban).
132. See SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, r. 3 (AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N
2003) ("Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial
final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause
permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class (the 'Clause Construction Award')");
JAMS, JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE r. 2, at 3-4 (effective May 1, 2009) ("[O]nce appointed, the
Arbitrator, following the law applicable to the validity of the arbitration clause as a whole, or the validity
of any of its terms, or any court order applicable to the matter, shall determine as a threshold matter
whether the arbitration can proceed on behalf of or against a class.").
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clauses where they did not previously have them.1 3 3 Even though some of
these companies may not be financial services companies, the logic is the
same. If they have to pay filing fees and other costs that they would not
have to pay in court, then arbitration sans a class action ban should be just
as much of a money-loser for them as it is for financial services companies.
The fact that they use arbitration clauses that do not necessarily contain a
class action ban undercuts the financial industry's assertion that you cannot
have one without the other.
Second, it seems unlikely that the small costs associated with paying filing
fees and arbitrator costs are enough to turn arbitration from a money-saving
form of dispute resolution into a money-losing form of dispute
resolution.1 3 4  As mentioned above, industry representatives tout
arbitration as a faster, cheaper, and more efficient alternative 
to court.135
Initially, in all the years (going back to the 1980s) in which arbitration
proponents have been claiming arbitration is faster and cheaper than court,
those proponents did not issue (until now) a caveat stating arbitration is
faster and cheaper only when a class action ban is involved or that it is
cheaper only if the industry does not have to pay the brunt of the initial
filing fees. Rather, such proponents have indicated that arbitration is a
financially sounder alternative for individual arbitration without
qualification. Now that it faces possible regulation, the industry's new
eleventh-hour claim, that arbitration is actually not cheaper than court when
conducted on an individual basis but that it is only a money saver when it
can block class actions, seems suspiciously convenient.
Additionally, the added costs that industry identifies do not appear to be
so onerous as to make individual arbitration infeasible. To be sure, there
are real costs to conducting arbitration. According to the Consumer Rules
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
1 3 6 consumers must pay a
133. See Deepak Gupta & Lina Khan, Arbitration as Wealth Tran er, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR L. &
POL'Y, Feb. 2016, at 1, 2 ("In the wake of Concepdon, companies across sectors [of the economy] have
quietly modified their contracts with employees and consumers to include terms requiring arbitration
and banning class actions, blocking access to the courts." (citing Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After
Class: Aggregate Lidgation in the Wake ofAT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHi. L. REv. 623 (2012))).
134. The CFPB found that consumers paid initial filing fees in 831 disputes, and that "the average
and median fees were $206 and $125 respectively." CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 40, 5 1.4.3, at 13. The study does not indicate, however, whether businesses
paid a share of the filing fee as well.
135. See supra notes 27, 89 and accompanying text.
136. The AAA is the dominant arbitration provider used by financial services companies, which
is why I discuss its rules here. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 40, § 2.5.3, at 34-35 (describing AAA's "predominance" in market share among the arbitration
clauses examined in its study).
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filing fee of $200 and the business must pay $1,700.137 Thus, if the business
also agrees to pay the consumer's fee, it is paying a total of $1,900.138 The
business must also pay for certain arbitrator expenses. For a case resolved
solely on written papers (called a "desk arbitration"), the business must pay
a flat fee of $750.139 The costs rise for telephonic or in-person arbitrations,
especially if the arbitration is decided by a panel of three arbitrators rather
than by a single arbitrator.14 ° However, for cases involving $25,000 or less,
which likely comprise the bulk of consumer claims and are the types of cases
most likely to be addressed by class actions, the rules provide that the matter
will be resolved by desk arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise.14 1
Thus, for most consumer cases, the company will pay around $2,500 in
fees.
14 2
137. CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, r. 55 (AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N 2016).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. For cases before single arbitrators, business pay an additional hearing fee of $500 plus $1,500
per day in arbitrator compensation. For cases before three-arbitrator panels, the filing fee rises to
$2,200, plus a $500 hearing fee and $1,500 per arbitrator per day. Id.
141. Id.
142. In its comments, some industry organizations also assert that they pay some of the
consumer's discovery costs in arbitration. See Letter from Am. Banker Ass'n et al., supra note 98.
However, they do not specify how much they pay or how costly discovery is. Most likely, the discovery
is much less extensive than that provided in court as one of the reasons that companies like arbitration
is that it ordinarily provides for much more limited discovery than litigation, which in turn saves money
and makes it harder for a plaintiff to acquire relevant evidence to support his or her claims. See
SECTION OF DIsPuTE RESOLUTION, AM. BAR ASS'N, BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION FOR
COMMERClAL DISPUTES 6, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/dispute_
resolution/committees/arbitration/arbitrationguide.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2016)
("Unless specifically agreed otherwise by the parties, discovery and related procedures are considerably
more limited in arbitration than in litigation.'). Of course, discovery in arbitration is not always so
limited. See Frankel, Concepcion andMis-Concepcion, supra note 104, at 249 (recognizing "proceedings
under standard arbitration rules are likely to include prehearing motion practice and extensive
discovery," and that "[airbitration proceedings are now often preceded by extensive discovery,
including depositions" (quoting Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The 'New Ifigation" 2010 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1, 6 (2010))). Discovery in arbitration could get expensive if the parties agree to the same
discovery rights as in court, and many parties do provide for expanded discovery tights in arbitration.
See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The 'New Lifigation", 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 23 (2010)
(noting international arbitration proceedings are increasingly mirroring court proceedings, and that
these arbitrations proceedings are "generally perceived as tending to be as expensive as litigation"
(quoting QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 7 (2006), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123295.pdf)).
However, expanded discovery is more likely in negotiated business-to-business arbitration agreements
than in standard-form non-negotiable business-to-consumer contracts. See, e.g., Lawrence W.
Newman, Agreements to Arbitrate and the Predictabity of Procedures, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1323, 1323
(2009) (finding business arbitration "has become more similar to litigation-particularly U.S.-style
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It seems unlikely that the potential profit margins on arbitration are so
narrow that $2,500 would tip the scales from arbitration to litigation. For
corporate parties, $2,500 may represent four to five hours of a single
lawyer's time. If arbitration is truly faster than litigation, it is likely more
than five hours faster. Likewise, if arbitration discovery is more limited, the
discovery savings, which corporate parties describe as astronomical when
pushing for discovery reforms in court,14 3 would likely be expected to
outweigh the filing fees. Similarly, whether the company has a higher
relative win rate in arbitration versus litigation is likely to make a bigger
difference in determining if arbitration is cost-effective as compared to court
than the fact of having to pay filing fees.144 Indeed, if the relative costs of
arbitration and litigation are so close that the filing fee is enough to make
arbitration impracticable for companies, that suggests that litigation is not
that much, if any, more inefficient or time-consuming than arbitration.
There is no small amount of tension between industry's claim that
arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation and that financial services
companies cannot afford arbitration if they have to pay the initial filing fee
for arbitration.
Third, it is striking that the industry immediately threatened to walk away
from arbitration altogether rather than first considering less severe
alternatives that would allow them to continue using arbitration. While
companies claim that they are losing money because they agree in their
contracts to pay the consumers' fees, they are the ones that write those
contracts. Nothing is stopping them from re-writing their arbitration
143. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Request for Information Regarding
Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements,
Docket No. CFPB-2012-0017 at 54 n.154 (Dec. 11, 2013) ("In the modem business world, many class
actions that are litigated past the pleading stage impose extraordinarily burdensome e-discovery costs,
as plaintiffs' lawyers demand e-mails and other electronic files from dozens, if not more, company
employees. In fact, a defendant business generally bears the brunt of discovery costs, which can
amount to many millions of dollars.').
144. Recent statistics in the employment arena indicate that companies fare better in arbitration
than in court. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study
ofConsumerArhitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 68 (2015) (analyzing consumer arbitrations from the American
Arbitration Association from 2009-2013 and concluding that corporate repeat players win at higher
rates in arbitration than others and that consumers prevail less often than shown in previous studies).
See generally Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequaa'y of Justice in Employment,
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014) (finding employees fare worse in arbitration than in
litigation). If so, then companies are saving money because they are paying out less in damages, and
that savings may be sufficient to offset the extra filing fees. SeeJean R. Sternlight, Disarming Emplqyees:
How American Employers Are Using Mandatoy Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK.
L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2015) (contending empirical evidence reveals "employees win less often and win
less money in arbitration than in litigation").
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agreements to require consumers to pay their own fees and discovery
costs.1 45 Similarly, if companies find that the American Arbitration
Association's fee schedule is so onerous to prevent them from taking part
in individual arbitrations, they can use a different arbitration provider, or
they can petition for the Association to change its rules. There is no
indication that the industry has done so, or has ever told the AAA that its
fee schedule for consumer arbitrations is too painful for companies to bear.
The fact that they have not done so undermines their assertion that they
cannot afford to use arbitration if class action bans are prohibited.146
It is not surprising that the industry is much more willing to say that
companies will abandon arbitration if the CFPB enacts its proposed rule
than it is to give rationales, or support for those rationales for its statements.
When examined closely, the industry's arguments lack evidentiary support
or persuasive force. That lack of support in turn suggests that the industry's
dire predictions will not come true, and that companies will not walk away
from arbitration if the CFPB adopts its proposed rule.
145. Actually, businesses may be disinclined to re-write their arbitration clauses to require
consumers to play their own filing fee because companies want to protect their class action bans at all
costs. They do not want to do anything else that would allow a consumer to argue that the arbitration
clause is unconscionable because, for example, it imposes such high costs on a consumer that the
consumer cannot afford to bring a claim in arbitration. See Richard Frankel, Bootstraps on the Ground: A
Response to Professor Lesli, 94 TEX. L. REV. 188, 198-99 (2016) (discussing why companies do not want
to put in any other terms into their arbitration clauses that would put the class action ban at risk); see
also Myriam Gilles, Kilhng Them with Kindness: Examining "Consumer-Friendy" Arbitration Clauses After
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 828 (2012) (detailing how companies
are including consumer-friendly provisions in their arbitration clauses as a way of protecting their class
action bans). And if they keep the class action ban in place, they have nothing to fear from agreeing
to pay consumers' costs because they know that almost no consumers will bring an individual
arbitration.
146. Businesses that use arbitration clauses know how to lobby arbitration providers to change
rules that the businesses do not like. For instance, JAMS, another prominent arbitration provider,
announced in November 2004 that it would not administer arbitrations arising out of contracts with
class action bans. See Kelly Thompson Cochran & Eric J. Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer
Arbitraion, 60 BUS. LAw. 785, 793 (2005) ("JAMS attempted to enforce a new policy from November
2004 through March 2005 that purported to invalidate consumer arbitration provisions that preclude
class claims."). The defense bar was "furious," and it responded swiftly and forcefully. Philip Allen
Lacovara, Class Action Arbitrations: The Challenge for the Business Communiy, CPR INT'L INST. FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (Mayer Brown), Jan. 11, 2008, at 1, 9, available at
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/512c5d76-Oee3-41a-9046-abdd85d3d358/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bdOf5fl2-9295-43f0-95cf-6fc527a98222/NEWSLINTL_
ARB_CPRI 1JAN08.PDF; Sue Reisinger, New JAMS Polig Has Angered GCs. Allowing Class Action
Claims Barred in Contracts Feeds Fear Others May Also, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 24, 2015, at 8. As a result, JAMS
reversed itself in short order. See Lacovara, supra, at 9 (offeringJAMS may have "flip-flopped" because
of "business pressure'); Nancy J. Moore, JAMS Reverses Poliy on Preclusion Clauses, Citing Court Decisions,
Neutrakoy Concerns, 6 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 216 (2005) (suggesting JAMS changed its policy after
businesses decided to stop usingJAMS as an arbitration administrator).
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But assuming that the industry's statements are correct, and that
arbitration will dry up if class action bans are no longer permitted, that
simply reinforces why the CFPB's rule should be adopted rather than
rejected.
C. If Finandal Services Companies Abandon Arbitration
If arbitration as a dispute resolution regime is sustainable only by
preventing injured consumers from seeking a remedy from a class action,
and only by allowing financial services providers to functionally immunize
themselves from almost all liability for their misconduct, then the CFPB's
rule becomes even more necessary for protecting consumers. This is
because the need for a class action ban to make arbitration viable indicates
that the viability of arbitration rests on massive claim suppression.
According to the financial services industry, claim suppression by
eliminating class actions is the only thing that enables companies to utilize
arbitration rather than court for resolving disputes. Essentially, the industry
argues that society should accept the loss of class actions in exchange for
the benefit of being required to go to arbitration to resolve arbitration
disputes.
147
The only parties that benefit from such a tradeoff are the financial
services providers themselves. They give up virtually nothing. Almost no
one brings an individual arbitration because either they do not know they
have been unlawfully treated, or it is not feasible to bring a claim on an
individual basis.14' As the CFPB found, only 25 consumers per year
initiated arbitrations for claims of $1,000 or less.149 Even accounting for
higher-stakes, the study shows an average of only 411 individual arbitrations
a year producing total relief averaging $300,000.150
Consumers, by contrast, give up a lot. The CFPB found that consumer
class actions provided an average of $540 million in total relief per year to
millions of consumers.1 5 1 That total is even greater when accounting for
deterrence effects and injunctive relief that cause companies to reform their
147. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 249-50 (explaining how the industry states that consumers
should be willing to trade in class actions to resolve disputes in arbitration).
148. See Resnik, supra note 68, at 2903-04 (discussing how consumers rarely bring arbitration
claims because of a lack of knowledge and resources).
149. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, § 1.4.3, at 11-12.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 1.4.7, at 16.
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business practices.152 Companies can use their "get out of jail free card,"1 3
and consumers are left holding the bag.
The logic underlying the industry's position further demonstrates that the
industry's goal is claim suppression. By using class action bans, companies
effectively make it so that the only way consumers can resolve disputes is
by bringing an individual action. But the industry is also saying that
individual actions are money-losers for them. The industry's position is
perhaps best encapsulated in the old joke where a retailer states: "We lose
money on each sale, but make it up on volume."' 5 4 If class action bans
make arbitration financially feasible for companies, they can do so only by
reducing the number of individual claims. Financial services companies
know that if class action bans are allowed and enforced, consumers simply
will not bring claims in meaningful numbers, and companies can continue
their illegal practices virtually unchecked.
Indeed, the financial services industry could not credibly argue that a mass
of individual arbitrations would be cheaper than a single, consolidated
proceeding. The purpose of a class action is to make proceedings more
efficient by resolving related claims in a single action.' If thousands of
consumers tried to bring individual arbitrations, each with their own filing
fees, evidence, discovery, and lawyer's time, those actions would collectively
cost far more than a single consolidated or class proceeding."5 6
Instead, the industry prefers a class action ban even if it makes
proceedings much more expensive. That was the essential premise of the
corporate position before the Supreme Court in Ameican Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant."5 7 In that case, it was virtually uncontested that
bringing individual antitrust actions could cost a million dollars per action
152. See Gupta & Khan, supra note 133, at 11 (citing CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT
TO CONGRESS, supra note 40, 5 1.4.7, at 16) (discussing the CFPB's study explaining that consumers'
benefit from class action suits are underestimated); see also Arbitration Agreements, supra note 17, at
32,858 (explaining that class action settlements benefit consumers by causing companies to change
their practices and identifying several settlements that provided substantial injunctive relief for
consumers).
153. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
154. See We Lose Mongy on Evey Sale, but Make It Up on Volume, BARRYPOPIK.COM (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new-york city/entry/we lose money-onevery-sale but
makeit..up-onvolume (describing the joke and its history).
155. See generally Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-18 (1997) (providing a
description of the characteristics of class actions pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
156. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (acknowledging that
numerous individual actions would likely cost more than one class action).
157. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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for cases that were valued in the thousands of dollars.1 58 The plaintiff
argued that these costs could be spread among plaintiffs if the class action
ban was struck down, but American Express and its corporate amici
argued-and the Supreme Court agreed-that the class action ban had to
be enforced even if it made arbitration prohibitively expensive.'5 9  That
shows that they were not interested in cost-savings or producing the most
efficient outcome. They wanted to protect the class action ban at all costs.
Finally, the fact that financial services companies may walk away from
arbitration if they are prohibited from using class action bans indicates that
they do not like arbitration when they might actually have to use it.
Companies like arbitration when it stops consumers from bringing claims
in arbitration. But once those barriers are taken away, and companies face
the possibility of actually resolving consumer claims in arbitration, they
distrust arbitration and do not want to use it. Notably, they distrust
arbitration for many of the same reasons that consumers and consumer
advocates have used to critique mandatory arbitration clauses. It is striking
that companies have said that if they are going to face class proceedings,
they would rather face them in court than in arbitration. The United States
Chamber of Commerce has described class arbitration as follows: "Class
arbitration is a worst-of-all-worlds Frankenstein's monster: It combines the
enormous stakes, formality and expense of litigation that are inimical to
bilateral arbitration with exceedingly limited judicial review of the
arbitrators' decisions."'1 60  When facing cases with serious stakes,
companies do not like the procedural informality and limited appellate and
judicial review of arbitration awards. But that formality and limited review
are precisely what companies rely on when telling consumers that they
should prefer arbitration because it is faster and cheaper than litigation.
1 6 1
And, importantly, consumer groups that are critical of the widespread use
of mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts complain that arbitration
offers fewer procedural protections than litigation and extremely limited
158. See id. at 2308 (acknowledging the cost of bringing individual actions would cost significantly
more than the value of the cases).
159. See id. at 2316 (discussing how American Express rejected any alternative that would have
made arbitration more feasible).
160. Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Plaintiff-Appellants at 2, Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. v. Sterman, No. 15-10627, 2015 WL
1598605 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2015).
161. See Am. Bankers Ass'n et al., Comment Letter on Arbitration Study, supra note 27, at 3
("Arbitration is faster, less expensive, and more effective than litigation, including class action litigation,
and customers are far more likely to obtain a decision on the merits and more meaningful relief.").
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appellate review.162 What is good for the goose is good for the gander. If
companies are unwilling to swallow arbitration's informalities when facing
high-stakes claims, one should be suspicious when those same companies
tell consumers that they should send their claims, which to them may carry
high-stakes, to arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
As mandatory arbitration clauses have become prevalent in consumer and
employment contracts, proponents of arbitration have long praised
arbitration as a faster and cheaper alternative to court. Now, it turns out,
according to some financial services companies, that these proponents were
wrong all along. According to the financial services industry, arbitration, at
least on an individual scale, is more expensive for companies than litigation.
What has changed in the interim? Not much, except for the CFPB's
proposal to prohibit financial services companies from using arbitration
clauses that ban class actions. In scrambling to find some way to scuttle the
proposed rule, the industry claims that arbitration is financially detrimental
to their bottom line. That is, unless arbitration is accompanied by a ban on
class actions that allows companies to cheat consumers of hundreds of
millions of dollars a year that companies can keep for themselves without
being held accountable. The industry's claim that it will abandon arbitration
altogether if class action bans are prohibited is logically and empirically
dubious. More troublingly, it underscores that the driving force behind
arbitration is not to provide consumers with an alternative forum to court,
but to deprive consumers of any forum at all.
162. See The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Testimony to the Subcomm. on the Constitution of U.S. S.
Judiciary Comm. 7-10, (2007) (testimony ofF. Paul Bland,Jr., Staff Attorney for PublicJustice). available
at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Bland%20Testimony/20121207.pdf
(describing that because of unique limitations of arbitration, consumers prefer litigation); Public
Citizen, Mandatoy Arbitration Clauses: Undermining the R 'gbts of Consumers, Employees, and Small Businesses
available at http://www.citizen.org/congress/articleredirect.cfm?ID=7332 (last visited Feb. 26,2017).
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